Despite its recognized inefficiency, the persistence of income hiding between spouses remains largely unaddressed in the literature. Our study suggests that one cause of persistency is that this behavior may provide strategic benefits, par- ticularly by affecting labor supply decisions and overall household income. Using a field experiment involving low-income workers in Southeast Asia, we estimate the effects of randomly disclosing spousal income on productivity in a standardized work task. Our findings indicate that income disclosure significantly affects labor productivity compared to a nondisclosure scenario, in which spouses can conceal any income generated. The effects exhibit notable gender differences: when in- come is disclosed to their spouses, women decrease productivity, while men increase productivity. We introduce a two-stage game model and further empirical tests to demonstrate that these gender differences arise from disparities in bargaining power, with men holding significantly more bargaining power than women. Over- all, this study sheds light on the unintended consequences of financial inclusion or pay transparency policies on both productivity and household inequality.

Performance-based pay has been lauded as a potential solution to enhance labor productivity in industries grappling with low output levels. However, despite theoretical arguments supporting the effectiveness of performance-based pay in motivating individual worker effort, its overall impact remains uncertain, particularly when transitioning from fixed pay to performance-based pay. This paper presents a unique natural experiment in the Cambodian garment manufacturing sector, where a large factory implements two major interventions: a worker performance monitoring system and a performance-based wage scheme. Leveraging the staggered roll-out of these interventions, we aim to disentangle the mechanisms through which performance-based pay influences labor productivity. By analyzing productivity changes in treated and untreated production lines, we will assess the effects of performance monitoring and performance-based pay. Additionally, we will investigate the sorting effect of performance-based pay by studying turnover and heterogeneous treatment effects based on workers' preferences for incentive systems.